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ABSTRACT
Domestic and multinational corporations have begun to enter retailing in
India, raising concerns that they will destroy the millions of small stores and
street vendor businesses that presently dominate retailing in the country. Poli-
cymakers know that corporate retailers can improve the efficiency and produc-
tivity of retailing and distribution in India, but they are also concerned about
possible harm to small businesses and loss of jobs among those who might not
have the skills and training needed to find alternative employment.
We examine whether corporate retailing has already harmed small retail
businesses in India (and to what extent if so) and how much damage might
occur in the future. We discuss how corporate retailing might benefit small re-
tailers and consumers and consider how small and large retailers might coexist
in a country where, in the next twenty years, 40% of the population and 70%
of gross domestic product may be concentrated in urban areas. We consider
problems that may arise if organized retailing grows and suggest ways in which
such problems could be addressed by policymakers.
1. INTRODUCTION
Where India shops in the future is at the center of a vigorous and ongoing
debate. On one side of the debate are the millions of street and pushcart ven-
dors and small retail stores that have dominated Indian retailing for centuries.
On the other side are large Indian and multinational corporations seeking new
opportunities in retailing. Small retailers claim that large firms, especially
multinationals, will destroy entrepreneurship and rob them of their livelihoods.
Large businesses say that they can provide better and cheaper products and
bring badly needed investment, efficiency, organization, and know-how to re-
tailing. Policymakers in India are wary of making changes that might harm
small businesses and erode employment, but they also seek to promote greater
efficiency and productivity in a growing sector of the economy that presently
accounts for 37% of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP).
Retailing is presently one of the few sectors of the economy in which the In-
dian government limits entry by foreign firms. Some retailers have entered the
Indian market under a provision allowing them 51% equity ownership in their
Indian operations provided that they sell products under a single brand name.
Examples of such firms are Louis Vuitton, Cartier, Armani, Reebok, Marks
and Spencer, Debenhams, Next, Bodyshop, Oshkosh, and Carter’s. Interna-
tional firms that want to sell multiple brands cannot open retail stores but can
own 100% equity in wholesale stores. Their customers must be institutional
buyers who pay in cash and carry the merchandise from the store shelves.
Between 2000 and 2010, multinational companies like Walmart and Metro
invested about $1.8 billion in such cash-and-carry stores that sell to retail-
ers, cooperatives, hotels, restaurants, caterers, and various food and non-food
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traders (Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion 2010). They offer
lower prices and wider assortments than traditional wholesalers and are open
for longer hours. Still, most multinational firms see cash-and-carry wholesal-
ing as a point of entry into India. Their aim is to obtain government approval
for 100% foreign direct investment (FDI) in multi-brand retailing.
Whether FDI in multi-brand retailing is allowed in India will depend on
several considerations. Joseph et al. (2008) observed that it is necessary to
meet growing consumer demand and bring needed investment to the supply-
chain infrastructure. They reported that an expansion of corporate retailers
has a limited, short-term effect on small stores. In addition, they suggest
that new and better jobs in small-scale manufacturing, food processing, and
distribution are likely to more than make up for any loss in jobs due to the
growth of organized retailing. Still, a report by the Parliamentary Standing
Committee on Commerce (2009) expressed reservations about the effects of
organized retailing on jobs in informal retailing and about the potential for
predatory pricing and monopolistic practices by corporate retailers.
This paper examines key issues related to the development of organized
retailing in India. Section 2 reviews the recent performance of India’s retailing
sector. Despite bold projections, it turns out that organized retailing has been
only moderately successful. Large retailers have struggled for profitability
while small retailers, including those selling food, have prospered and grown.
Section 3 discusses possible reasons for the modest success of large retailers.
Section 4 outlines short- and long-term prospects for retailing in India. It
examines why retail sales are likely to grow at a slower rate than GDP; why
sales of food are likely to grow at a slower rate than sales of transportation,
communication, and durable goods; and what such trends imply for the need
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and opportunities for organized retailing. Section 5 considers the benefits that
corporate retailing could potentially bring to the distribution system in India.
Section 6 examines how organized retailing is likely to grow over the next
twenty years. It suggests that a disproportionately high rate of urban growth
in both population and economic activity will create a surge in urban demand
that will allow both small and large retailers to prosper. Rural growth will be
slower and can be stimulated in part by giving incentives for investment in the
supply chain or requiring such investment by multinational firms seeking entry
into multi-brand retailing. Section 7 examines various problems that can arise
with the growth of organized retailing and suggests ways in which these may
be addressed by policymakers.
2. ASPECTS OF RETAILING IN INDIA
Types of retail businesses
Businesses in India are commonly categorized as either formal or informal
and as organized or unorganized. To understand the Indian retail climate, we
must define these distinctions.
According to the Ministry of Labor and Employment,1 the informal sector
consists of unincorporated businesses that are owned and run by individuals or
households. These businesses are not legally distinct from their owners, who
raise capital at their own risk and have unlimited personal liability for debts
and obligations. Informal businesses typically employ family members and
casual labor without formal contracts. Formal businesses are corporations,
1See “Informal sector in India: approaches for social security,” an undated report by the
Ministry of Labor and Employment, Government of India.
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limited companies, and businesses run by or on behalf of cooperative societies
and trusts.
The organized sector comprises incorporated businesses. Information about
this sector is available from company budgets and reports. Importantly, part-
nerships, private and limited companies, and businesses run by cooperative
societies and trusts are not considered to be organized businesses in India. In-
stead, they are classified as part of the unorganized sector, which also includes
all businesses in the informal sector.
As Figure 1 shows, organized retailing includes some large incorporated
stores, and all chain stores, supermarkets, hypermarkets, department stores
and store-in-stores. Unorganized retailing includes all informal retailers, in-
cluding kirana stores, paan shops, vegetable and fruit stalls, street hawkers,
and pushcart and street vendors. It also includes general merchants, chemists,
appliance stores, and various specialty stores that are part of the formal sector
but that operate as partnerships, private and limited companies, cooperatives,
or trusts.
Retail employment
Retailing is the second largest employer in India after agriculture. Ac-
cording to the National Survey Sample Organization (64th Round), retailers
employed 33.1 million people — an estimated 7.2% of all workers in the country
— in 2007-08 (Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion 2010). Infor-
mal retailing provides employment to the individuals and families who run
the country’s 12 million or so kirana stores and to the casual workers such
as shop and delivery boys who they employ. Informal retailing also provides
employment to about 3.4 million street vendors and several million pushcart
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vendors who sell products door to door and on the street. In contrast, or-
ganized retailing, a category that includes supermarkets and hypermarkets,
employ about 500,000 people, almost all in urban areas. Reardon, Timmer
and Minten (2010) note that supermarkets and business hubs have rapidly
grown in rural towns in India.
Retail employment grew at a slower rate than overall employment in India
between 2005 and 2006. More recently, the two have grown at about the same
rate because retail employment rates have risen and overall employment rates
have fallen. Between 1999-2000 and 2004-05, employment in retailing grew by
more than 30% in rural areas and by less than 3% in urban areas. Thus, the
major growth in employment during this period was in rural areas.
The Parliamentary Standing Committee on Commerce (2009) has noted
that there is still no systematic, large-scale study examining how corporate
retailing affects small stores. Limited evidence is provided by Joseph et al.
(2008), who use the results of a survey to conclude that the entry of an or-
ganized retailer leads to the annual closure of about 1.7% small stores in its
neighborhood. The authors note that by changing the mix of the merchandise
and offering more services to consumers, small retailers were able to regain
sales and profits that they initially lost when a corporate retailer entered their
neighborhood.
Retail sales
Table 1 shows the Economist Intelligence Unit’s (2008) estimates for total
retail sales in India between 2004 and 2009. It also shows Euromonitor Inter-
national’s (2010) estimates for formal-sector retail sales over the same period.
We infer informal-sector sales and the shares held by each sector using these
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two data sets. Differences in data-collection and estimation methods, and in
the years in which the estimates were made, can introduce errors in the es-
timates. With this caveat, we can draw several important conclusions about
the status of retailing in India and trends in its development.
First, total retail sales increased by approximately 70% between 2004 and
2009, from $294 billion to $496 billion. Second, sales grew over this period
by about 43% for retailers in the formal sector and about 97% for retailers in
the informal sector. The annual average rate of sales growth was about 11%
for all retailing, 7.5% for organized retailing, and 14.5% for informal retailing.
Thus, from 2004 to 2009, retail sales grew almost twice as fast in the informal
sector as in the formal sector and at a substantially faster rate than India’s
GDP, which grew at about 8.5% over the period. Third, in 2007, total retail
sales in the informal sector surpassed those of the formal sector. By 2009, the
informal sector held about 56% of retail sales, 8% higher than its 48% share
in 2004. These data suggest that informal retailing is more than surviving; it
is flourishing. At present growth rates, the gap between formal and informal
retailing will continue to widen — family-owned stores and street vendors will
take a larger share of retail sales.
Since all organized retailing is part of the formal sector, we estimate retail
sales for the organized sector as approximately $5 billion (3.3% of $153.63
billion) in 2003 and approximately $11 billion (5% of $218.92 billion) in 2009.
The remaining sales in the formal sector, then, represent unorganized retailing.
We can infer that unorganized retailing grew from about $148 billion (96.7%
of $153.63 billion) in 2004 to about $208 billion (95% of $218.92 billion) in
2009. Equivalently, unorganized formal retailing grew at an average annual
rate of about 6.3% from 2004 to 2009.
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To summarize, the average rate of sales growth from 2004 to 2009 was
about 14.5% for informal retailing, 7.5% for organized retailing, and 6.3% for
unorganized formal retailing. That means that the share of sales for the last
group declined. Organized retailing has grown in the last decade but at a sub-
stantially lower rate than predicted by industry analysts a few years ago. For
example, Joseph et al. (2008) predicted 10% annual growth for unorganized
retailing and 40–45% annual growth for organized retailing between 2008 and
2012. They projected that the share of organized retail would grow from about
4% in 2008 to 16% by 2011-12. However, the performance of the organized
retail sector has fallen far short of these expectations, and future prospects are
less sanguine.
There may be several reasons why sales in formal unorganized retailing
grew more slowly than organized retailing and informal retailing. First, it is
likely that large corporate retailers compete most directly with other retailers
in the formal sector and less directly with retailers in the informal sector. For
example, hypermarkets and department stores might take disproportionately
more sales from mass merchandise stores and specialty stores than from kirana
stores and street vendors. Second, to take advantage of growth opportunities,
some formal unorganized retailers might have incorporated and registered and
now are reclassified as organized businesses. For example, a privately owned
appliance store might grow into a store selling a full range of durable goods,
which have seen substantial demand in the last five years. It might then be
reclassified as an organized retailer after it develops into a larger organization
and registers as a corporation.
Still, aggregate projections of the sort discussed so far are not sufficient to
meaningfully predict the need for organized retailing in the future. Retailing
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of durable or transportation goods requires substantially greater investment
and organization than is feasible for small retailers, and, as we discuss later,
these are the retailing areas that are likely to grow fastest in the next several
decades. Long-term demand projections that are disaggregated by industry
and rural/urban area are necessary to make reasonable assessments of both
the need and the likelihood of substantial corporate investment in areas such
as distribution systems and related infrastructure, the benefits of which accrue
over decades.
Food sales
Groceries are a large share of retail sales. Table 2 shows Euromonitor’s
(2010) estimates for the share of food sales that comes from in-store food
retailing. The estimates for total sales include sales by street and pushcart
vendors.
Between 2004 and 2009, small grocery stores lost about 3% of market
share. However, because primary demand for food has been growing, these
small stores still increased sales by 22% during the same period. The sales
base for these stores is so large that 22% amounted to Rs. 815 billion, or
about 62% of the Rs. 1,324 billion in incremental store sales over the time
period. Thus, while small stores might have gained even more sales if organized
retailing had not entered the market, they still grew in a growing market. The
data in Table 2 do not suggest that small food retailers are being decimated
or that the entry of organized retailers has harmed the jobs and livelihoods of
small retailers and their workers.
Table 3 shows sales and market shares of the key organized grocery retailers
in the organized sector from 2005 through 2009. Individually, each of the firms
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shown has less than 1% of the market. Among them, the top five accounted for
2.3% of grocery store sales in 2009. The total share of sales for hypermarkets
and supermarkets grew from Rs. 27.5 billion (about a 1
2
% market share) in
2004 to Rs. 177.7 billion (nearly a 3% market share) in 2009. Reardon et.al.
(2010) report that the share of fresh produce in leading chain stores has risen to
10-15%, a level achieved after 15-20 years in Mexico and 40 years in USA. But
profitability has eluded organized retailers. Some, including Vishal Trading
and Subhiksa Trading Services, have closed. Subhiksa was once the second
largest retail chain in India with about 1,600 discount food stores. Other
organized retailers have incurred losses and cut back on planned expansions
since 2009.
3. ADVANTAGES FOR SMALL RETAILERS
Various reasons have been given for this limited success by organized retailing
in India so far: inflated expectations of retailers, unsustainably fast growth,
lack of acceptance by consumers with longstanding shopping habits, lack of
experience among organized retailers, lack of trained sales personnel, sharply
higher store rentals, and aggressive reactions by unorganized retailers to re-
tain customers. Almost every organized retailer now recognizes that it cannot
compete with unorganized retailers in all product categories, even on prices.
For example, food stores like Reliance Fresh offer lower prices on fresh pro-
duce, but their prices for packaged goods are typically higher than those of
unorganized retailers because the latter typically do not charge taxes.2
2Minton, Reardon and Sutadhar (2010) report that organized retailers in Delhi sell prod-
ucts at the same or lower prices than unorganized retailers. This appears to be the case
for fresh foods and vegetables, but the post-tax prices for processed and packaged foods is
typically higher in organized retail stores.
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Unorganized retailers have several other advantages: population density,
the retailers’ flexibility and responsiveness to consumer needs, efficient space
utilization, low operating costs, and a business model that focuses on livelihood
for owners rather than profits for an organization.
India has a population density of 937 people per square mile. By contrast,
China and the United States have population densities of 360 and 82 people
per square mile, respectively. Japan, which has 873 people per square mile, is
similar to India in terms of population density, and small stores have continued
to prosper in Japan. The population densities of Indian cities, and of certain
neighborhoods within cities, are remarkably higher than the population density
of the country. For example, Delhi has a population density of 24,197 people
per square mile (comparable to New York, which has 27,532 people per square
mile); Seemapuri, the densest neighborhood in Delhi, has 76,342 people per
square mile. But Delhi and Seemapuri pale in comparison with Mumbai and
Dharavi. Mumbai has 57,000 people per square mile and Dharavi, its densest
neighborhood, is eleven times as dense as the city and has about 600,000
residents per square mile.3
High population density allows closely located small and large stores to
coexist. Market entry by a large store may change the mix of products a small
store offers to differentiate its offerings and the two types of stores may cater to
different market segments, but both can survive if there are enough consumers
in an area.
High population density offers other advantages to small stores. Consumers
3Wikipedia list of sovereign states and dependent territories by population den-
sity, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List of countries by population density. Data on pop-
ulation densities for Indian cities and states are from India’s Ministry of Home Affairs,
www.censusindia.gov.in/Census Data 2001/ India at glance/density.aspx.
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tend to make smaller, more frequent purchases in denser areas because they
have smaller homes and cannot stock up on necessities.4 Large stores in urban
areas in India can seldom attract large numbers of distant consumers because
only those with cars typically travel to a distant store. These customers are
likely to make the trip to a large store infrequently because of the time and
inconvenience of negotiating traffic and finding parking. In contrast, small
retailers serve consumers within a small radius and, unlike closely located
organized stores, take phone orders and can offer personalized services at low
cost. For example, they can afford to make home deliveries because it is
relatively inexpensive to send a delivery boy to ten homes that are close by.
This is also why small stores can afford to make home deliveries in New York,
where unskilled labor is far more expensive than it is in Indian cities.
Second, small retailers have the ability to respond in a flexible way to
consumer needs. For example, a small food store might sell a single egg or a
dozen, two slices of bread or a loaf, a quarter stick of butter or a kilogram,
and a single-serve slice or a brick of ice cream. Paan shops are known to sell
single sticks or packets of cigarettes. This flexibility in meeting micro-demand
is not easily available to organized retailers.
Most small stores accept product returns, exchange damaged goods, and
give credit to customers with whom they have longstanding relationships.
They also know the likes and dislikes of individual customers, recommend
new products to them, and adjust prices for different customers — they are
true practitioners of first-degree price discrimination. Organized retailers find
it difficult to provide such services, which can be important to customers,
4India’s poor infrastructure also favors frequent purchases from small retailers because
frequent power cuts and outages limit the quantity of fresh foods and dairy products that
can be stored in homes with refrigerators.
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especially when one considers that people build routines around and derive
pleasure from the many small aspects of shopping: the daily call of a veg-
etable seller, haggling over price at the weekly street bazaars, the nightly paan
and cigarette, and the chai shop, are all part of the rhythm of Indian life. Such
rhythms may change but not quickly.
Third, small stores manage physical space far more efficiently than large
ones, and space utilization is especially important in India, where real estate
and rental costs are high and likely will rise, especially in urban areas. One
disadvantage for large stores using a self-serve layout is that they need room to
allow customers to walk through the store. Self-serve layouts in Indian stores
are especially poorly managed. In some, products are placed on three or four
shelves in each aisle; in others, shelves go to the ceiling, where customers
cannot reach them. Fresh produce is often scattered on the floor and large
boxes lie partially opened in the middle of aisles. In contrast, kirana stores
and vegetable sellers typically make much better use of space with one or two
people picking out and packing customer orders.
Fourth, the cost of operation is typically substantially higher for organized
retailers. Unorganized retailers usually rely on family members to buy and sell
products. In many cases, their stores are not physically separated from their
homes. They use unskilled labor, hire no managers or sales clerks, have little
loss due to stealing and pilferage, and have few overhead and utility costs.
Finally — and crucially — the main reason small retailers are in business is
to make a living. They convert their homes into shops, use them to store goods,
and hire casual workers when needed. Household members typically don’t
earn separate salaries and are concerned about family income. In contrast,
organized retailers rent or buy stores, pay salaries and benefits to employees,
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cannot easily fire workers, and incur substantial fixed and overhead costs.
Overall profitability after expenses, rather than a livelihood, is needed to keep
an organized business going. These differences in means and objectives make
it more likely that small retailers will survive.
4. GROWTH PATTERNS IN RETAILING
Both the Economist Intelligence Unit and Euromonitor International project
that retail sales will grow at about 15% per year for at least the next five years.
Joseph et al. (2008) forecasted 13% annual growth in retail sales from 2006-
07 to 2011-12 with total retail sales rising from $322 billion to $590 billion
over the period. They also predicted that unorganized retail sales will grow
at approximately 10% per annum from $309 billion in 2006-07 to $496 billion
in 2011-12, and that organized retail will grow 45–50% per year and attain a
16% share of retail sales by 2011-12.
These projections seem to be overly optimistic. As previously noted, or-
ganized retailing had grown to only about a 5% share of retail sales by 2009
and is not likely to grow at 40–45% per year. Overall retail sales are also
likely to grow more slowly than projected for at least two reasons. First, retail
purchases are not likely to grow as fast as household consumption, of which
they are a part. Second, household consumption itself is not likely to grow as
fast as GDP in India. Taken together, these two considerations suggest that
the rate of overall growth in retail sales is likely to fall below the GDP growth
rate for the next several years, although some retail categories such as durable
goods and personal transportation (including automobiles) might grow at a
faster rate. As noted previously, food retailing is likely to continue to grow at
a lower rate than GDP.
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Analysis by the consulting firm Goldman Sachs (2009) suggests that house-
hold consumption declines as a share of GDP until per capita GDP rises to the
$1,500–$2,000 range. Once per capita GDP exceeds that range, household con-
sumption increases (see the panel on the left side of Figure 2). Figure 3 shows
that the share of GDP due to household consumption has slowly increased
over the last several decades in developed countries like France, Germany, the
United Kingdom, the United States, and Japan, but has steadily decreased in
countries like India, Brazil, and China. In particular, household consumption
in India has steadily declined from about 80% of GDP in the early 1970s to
about 55% of GDP in 2009. We might expect it to further decline in the near
future and then to begin increasing once per capita GDP passes the noted
range.
The share of household expenditure devoted to retail purchases also changes
in an emerging economy, as does the allocation of retail expenditures to dif-
ferent product categories. As per capita GDP increases, households spend
disproportionately more on communications, transportation, durable goods,
education, health, and recreation, and spend disproportionately less on gro-
ceries and clothing (see the panel on the right side of Figure 2). The data
for India are broadly consistent with these patterns. For example, Figure 4
shows that expenditures on communications and transportation have grown
rapidly since 2005-06 and expenditures on clothing, footwear, furniture, and
appliances are growing faster than expenditures on food (note that the effect
of the economic slowdown on growth in these categories can be seen in Figure
4). As previously noted and as shown in Figure 5, consumers’ expenditures
on groceries have decreased as a fraction of retail sales from 67.5% in 2005 to
61.5% in 2009. The annual rate of growth in grocery sales also decreased from
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6.3% in 2005 to 2.5% in 2009. These changes are likely to persist.
In summary, we expect three broad trends in retail sales. First, overall
sales will grow at a slower rate than GDP. Second, food sales are presently the
largest category across all retail products but are likely to grow at a slower
rate than overall sales. Food retailing is likely to become more competitive
and more efficient; retailers in the informal sector may continue to enjoy the
advantages already noted. Third, retailing for durable goods, automobiles,
restaurants, hotels, and recreation will grow faster than it will for food and
basic commodities. These businesses require large investments and are likely
to further increase the presence of organized retailing in India. As the panel on
the left side of Figure 6 shows, retailers of durable goods have only modestly
penetrated the Indian market and can be profitably expanded for some time.
How long a time is illustrated in the panel on the right side of Figure 6, which
shows that the share of durable good expenditures continued to grow for more
than 65 years in the United States.
5. BEYOND SELLING
The discussion so far has considered retailing in the context of where consumers
shop. But the ongoing debate about retailing is not just about types of retail
stores. It is also about the entire distribution system in India with retailing
being only the most visible end.
Small retailers have no choice but to take distribution channels as given.
They do not have the resources or power to make any changes in the supply
chain. Organized retailers, in contrast, have the knowledge, ability, and re-
sources, and their profitability depends greatly on the efficiency of the entire
supplier-to-consumer distribution system. Firms like Walmart and Carrefour
15
are successful around the world because they can extract savings by improving
the productivity and efficiency of the distribution system. That same knowl-
edge and ability can be used to improve distribution in India. However, it is
that very ability that paralyzes policymakers when they hear that Walmart
destroys small businesses in the United States, despite the fact that the Indian
situation is not the American situation. Foe example, it is easy for someone
living in rural America to drive twenty miles to a Walmart store. But a similar
superstore could not survive in rural India where road access is poor, few peo-
ple have cars, and most consumers cannot afford to spend as much, or carry or
store as much in their homes. And as noted, urban areas have high population
densities, where small stores can effectively compete against large stores.
Some organized retailers have begun investing in distribution system im-
provements. For example, Mukesh Ambani, chairman of Reliance Industries,
envisions a system in which Reliance Retail will work closely with farmers
and other rural workers, buy directly from them, and handle all aspects of
distribution, including processing, transportation, warehousing, storage, and
retailing. Edge Singapore (2009) reports that the company is prepared to
set up its private cargo airline to bring fresh produce to its network of Re-
liance Fresh supermarkets. Reardon. et. al. (2010) describe how retailers like
Hariyali Kisaan Bazaar and ITC Choupal Sagar have set up rural business
hubs that can be used for procuring grain, milk and vegetables, and to pro-
vide one-stop shopping for farmers. A hub might have a small supermarket, an
stores within a store that offers banking, insurance and heath services. Mega-
food parks and integrated agro-food parks have also begun to emerge in rural
areas. The government acts as an infrastructure facilitator, providing water,
electricity and technical assistance to farmers. A private sector firm anchors
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the park and invites processors and retailers to invest in various operations
and services at the park.
Still, there are many important areas of distribution in India that are in
need of serious improvement. Consider cold storage. With an annual yield
of about 180 million tons, India is the second largest producer of fruits and
vegetables in the world. But it has only 23.6 million tons of cold storage and
80% of that is used for potatoes. About 25–30% of fruits and vegetables and
5–7% of food grains spoil. Estimated post-harvest losses are Rs. 1 trillion per
year with 57% of that due to avoidable waste. Still, investments in cold storage
chains have remained insignificant despite the government allowing 100% FDI
(Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion 2010).
A similar situation exists with respect to warehousing. Halarnkar and
Randhawa (2010) report that insufficient warehousing capacity resulted in
17.8 million tons of wheat and rice being stored under tarpaulin in India in
2010 with about 10 million tons at risk of rotting. In Punjab, 49,000 tons
of food grain were unfit for consumption after being left out through three
monsoons and were to be destroyed. Appalled by the situation, the Supreme
Court of India ordered in August 2010 that the government must give food
grain it cannot store to the poor for free (Sinha 2010). But even this policy
is difficult to implement because the cost of transporting the grain to people
who need it is high. Meanwhile, the cost of food has risen sharply.5
Logistics costs can be as high as 10% of sales for some organized retailers
in India. Overall, logistics costs are around 14% of GDP in India, which is
much higher than 8% of GDP in the United States (Technopak Retail Outlook
5Basu (2010) notes that poor food grain storage alone is not the reason for large price
increases and that lowering prices will require a redesign of the mechanisms by which India
acquires and releases food to the market.
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2008). The reason is that the Indian distribution system is both wasteful and
inefficient. For example, the cost of moving a cargo container one kilometer is
50% higher in India than in the United States (Manoj 2008). V. Shunmugam,
chief economist at the commodity exchange MCX in Mumbai, India, offers
an example: The government procures wheat at $23.50 per 100 kilograms in
Madhya Pradesh; transporting it to Tamil Nadu adds between $11.50 and
$13.50 depending on whether road or rail transport is used (Knowledge at
Wharton 2010).
Currently, about 77% of India’s goods are transported by road and that
number is expected to rise to about 85% in the near future. However, the
road-transportation system is largely unorganized and fragmented. Operators
who have twenty or more trucks are responsible for only 6% of the traffic.
The vast majority of the traffic comes from small businessmen with just a few
trucks (Sriram et al. 2006). There are few economies of scale or scope.
The most visible example of inefficiency and corruption is the public dis-
tribution syste m, which runs about 478,000 fair-price shops. It is the largest
retail chain in the world and is meant to provide subsidized food to the poor
in India (Knowledge at Wharton 2010). But as the Wadhwa committee (2009)
reports, there is large-scale corruption in the public distribution system. Es-
timates are that two-thirds of the grain destined for distribution to the poor
is stolen or adulterated (Economist 2010).6 The government’s response is to
increase food subsidies, which rose by 65% in 2009-10 to more than $15.6 bil-
lion or Rs. 72,000 crores (Financial Express 2010).7 In the longer run, such
6Minten e.t al. (2010) report that two-third of the Fair Price Shops that distribute
subsidized rice in Delhi were found to be closed during regular opening hours.
7The subsidy, given by the Central Government to procurement agencies like the Food
Corporation of India, covers the difference between the buying and selling price. To ensure
that farmers get at least the minimum support price and that food is available at a below-
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massive subsidies provide no lasting systemwide benefit capable of reducing
costs for all retailers and prices for all consumers. We are not suggesting that
the poor should not be given subsidized food. Instead, the long-term solution
is to replace subsidies with an efficient and productive distribution system that
can operate at much lower cost and benefit producers and consumers.
Again, the organized retailing sector can bring about improvements in each
of the areas noted because it has the means, knowledge, and need to do so.
By working directly with producers, it can dramatically improve the incomes
of the poor, including farmers, who typically earn a third of the final price for
their products. In contrast, the international norm is that two-thirds of the
final price is earned by farmers. Why the difference? It comes in part from
the Indian distribution system’s higher costs and greater waste and in part
because wholesale markets, which are regulated by state agricultural produce
and market committees, operate as monopolies. Farmers are often at the
mercy of wholesalers, and even simple systems of grading and sorting produce
are not common in the country. Firms like Walmart and Reliance are keen
to invest in farm-to-consumer delivery systems, which are not automatically
bad for Indian farmers or consumers. The business model for these firms is
to squeeze out every penny by making the supply chain lean and efficient, a
good thing if, in the process, the country gets a modern distribution system
and the benefits can be shared with farmers and small retailers. Bajaj (2010)
reports that some multinational firms like Walmart are helping farmers to
improve their growing and harvesting practices (Bajaj 2010). These firms can
also bring both financial investment and experience in improving supply-chain
market price to the poor, government procurement agencies buy food at above-market costs
and sell it at below-market prices.
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productivity and efficiency, which can benefit small and large retailers in India.
6. LONG-TERM CONSIDERATIONS
The preceding discussion about the benefits of improving the distribution sys-
tem would be worthwhile even if India was not expected to change in any
significant way in the next twenty years. But the need for a more modern
distribution system becomes urgent when we consider the ways in which the
country is expected to change. The most significant changes from the per-
spective of retailing are (1) the magnitude of the expected increase in demand
over the next twenty years, and (2) the rapid and ongoing urbanization of the
country.
Regarding long-term demand, if India’s GDP grows at an average annual
rate of even 7% per annum for the next twenty years, it will multiply by a
factor of about four by 2030. If retailing accounts for even 30% of GDP, the
increase in retail sales between 2010 and 2030 will exceed a trillion dollars.
This is far too large to be accommodated entirely by unorganized retailers
or to be left alone with no significant effort to improve the productivity and
efficiency of the distribution and retailing system in India.
Second, as Figure 7 shows, economic growth has historically been closely
related to urbanization. In his 2005 Independence Day speech to the nation,
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh observed that a third of India’s population
lives in urban areas today and, “keeping in mind the speed at which urbaniza-
tion is taking place, the day is not far off when over 50% of India’s population
will be residing in urban areas” (Singh 2005). More income and wealth is
likely to be concentrated in urban areas, which in turn will affect where and
how retailing grows.
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According to census reports, the number of people living in Indian cities
grew from 290 million in 2001 to 340 million in 2008. India has the second
largest number of urban dwellers in the world. Furthermore, only 20% of
the population increase in cities is due to migration; the rest comes from the
expansion of city boundaries or the reclassification of rural areas. From 2001
through 2008, India’s urban population grew 58% faster than the population
of the country as a whole.
A study by the McKinsey Global Institute (2010) predicts that by the year
2030 India will have a population of 1.47 billion and 40% of the population
will live in urban areas. Thus, the urban population will grow to about 590
million, roughly 250 million more than recorded in the 2008 census. The
number of cities with more than a million residents is projected to increase
from 42 in 2010 to 68 in 2030. Six cities are expected to have populations
of 10 million or more. Mumbai’s population is expected to exceed 33 million,
Delhi’s population to exceed 25 million, and Kolkata’s population to exceed
22 million. The McKinsey study also projects that the urban share of GDP
will rise to 69% by 2030, up from 58% in 2008, and that about 120 million
new urban jobs will be created between 2008 and 2030.8 The number of urban
households earning less than Rs. 90,000 per year is expected to fall below 20%,
and the number of people earning between Rs. 200,000 and Rs. 1 million per
year is expected to increase fourfold from 32 million to 147 million. In contrast,
75% of urban populations today are in the lowest income segment with average
earnings of about Rs. 80 (about $1.80) per day.
These forecasts, even if only approximately correct, have significant im-
8The analysis assumes annual GDP growth of 7.4% per year between 2008 and 2030 with
urban GDP growing 8.3% per year and rural GDP growing 5.9% per year.
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plications for retailing. First, they imply that retailing will not grow evenly;
rather, it will grow at a higher rate in urban areas that can accommodate
and will require both organized and unorganized retailers. For example, the
number of modern retail outlets in Delhi has more than doubled in each of
the last three years (Minten, Reardon and Sutradhar 2010). Second, urban
retailing is likely to remain the strategic focus of organized retailers because
there will be increasingly more numerous and more aﬄuent consumers to serve
in that market. Third, rural economic growth will require stimulus. Some of
it can come from organized retailers investing in a variety of supply-chain ac-
tivities in rural areas, such as food processing, storage and warehousing, and
transportation and shipment hubs. Some of these investments are likely to
be made in rural areas close to towns and cities (e.g., warehousing), others
will be close to farmers and suppliers (e.g., food processing, storage), and still
others will be at locations that make sense from a logistical standpoint (e.g.,
trans-shipment points and distribution hubs).
7. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS
There are some inherent advantages of size that benefit organized retailers.
Concerns have been voiced about whether large retailers would be able to
create artificial shortages and price volatility. Mechanisms to limit such power
are desirable (Singh 2010). Large retailers can also obtain favorable terms from
manufacturers and other suppliers that smaller retailers cannot. And only
large retailers can bypass conventional distribution channels, use information
technology to organize ordering and order processing systems, and benefit
from lower logistical and transaction costs owning to economies of scale and
better supply-chain practices. Efforts are being made by small retailers to form
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cooperatives so that they can obtain similar benefits. Bhartiya Udyog Vyapar
Mandal, the largest national-level association of kirana stores, is leading one
such effort that is focused on negotiating better prices from manufacturers,
bypassing middlemen, and obtaining financing at terms that are otherwise
available only to large organizations (Dave 2008). More such efforts need to
be developed and promoted.
There is a need to limit the extent to which corporate retailers can obtain
special privileges, such as access to desired locations to set up stores. Cor-
porate retailers are making some of the largest and most expensive deals in
metropolitan centers. However, there is no ceiling on the size or number of
commercial outlets that may be started in a given commercial zone once they
comply with some basic criteria of breadth of road. The central government
has no control over this matter, and state governments have yet to devise
policies related to these issues. Concern has also arisen about enforcement
of existing regulations governing operation issues such as opening and closing
hours. Some large stores remain open for ten or eleven hours a day, including
Sundays.
It is necessary to consider the possibility of implicit collusion among or-
ganized retailers, who might carve up and share parts of a larger market and
use tactics such as predatory pricing to drive out small retailers (Joseph et
al. 2008, Parliamentary Standing Committee on Commerce 2009). Similarly,
organized retailers can hold significant power over channels of distribution.
For example, a large retailer could lock out specific suppliers or make onerous
demands from small manufacturers who depend on it for business. Concerns
about the adverse effects of monopoly and monopsony power have arisen in
many contexts across countries and industries, and need to be anticipated and
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addressed by policy makers in the context of retailing in India (Kalhan and
Franz 2009).
There are significant concerns that organized retailers in the food industry
might transfer business risks onto suppliers and growers (Singh 2010). For
example, organized retailers might initially offer incentives for contract farm-
ing, share know-how, arrange or give credit at favorable terms, offer higher
prices, and give price guarantees. Subsequently, they might force farmers
to plant certain crops and/or particular seeds, require over-fertilization, and
emphasize the selection of produce that meets storage and shipment require-
ments rather than the nutritional needs of consumers. Gopalakrishnan and
Sreenivasa (2009) note that corporate food provision can adversely affect land
productivity, food security, price stability, employment and credit.
The use of greater mechanization, leading to layoffs and possible exploita-
tion of farm laborers, also is a concern. Contract farming is expected to favor
large farmers, potentially driving subsistence farmers to leave their farms and
become laborers. At the same time, there is a need to educate and train an
adequate number of retail workers for the organized sector. It is essential to
educate and train the massive numbers of young people expected to join the
work force, and to retrain millions of others who might be displaced from
farming and enter such sectors as retailing and manufacturing over the next
twenty years.
These are significant issues that policymakers need to address using a mix
of incentives and regulations that ensure competition in the distribution sys-
tem and thereby prevent excesses and exploitation. For example, information
systems are critical to management of modern supply chains because they
affect how suppliers are linked to retailers, orders are taken and processed,
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and inventories are managed. Information systems should be required to use
common, interoperable standards, provide open access to buyers and suppli-
ers across retail chains and cooperatives, and foster competition among large
organized retailers.
8. CONCLUSIONS
No one has a crystal ball that can perfectly predict how organized retailing will
grow in India, but it is likely that it will have a useful and important place.
It is not likely that small retailers will disappear from India. Both large and
small retailers can and should coexist to serve different consumer segments and
needs, and to contribute in complementary ways to the economic development
of the country.
It is understandable that owners of small stores view corporate retailers
as a great threat. No one likes competition, especially from a stronger force.
But as we have argued, growth in demand is likely to be large, and increasing
population density, especially in urban areas, will require the coexistence of
small and large retailers.
As always, policymaking must be based on a balanced assessment of the
present and future needs of different groups in society. In the short run, small
retailing as a whole is not only surviving but thriving, and large corporate
retailers are finding it difficult to become profitable. In the long run, large
corporate retailers can survive if they improve systemwide efficiency and pro-
ductivity in the distribution chain, something that the country needs and that
can benefit small retailers as long as appropriate incentives and regulations are
provided. The economic growth of rural areas will become a bigger concern,
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and policymakers should find ways to direct investments by corporate retailers
to benefit the rural economy and citizens.
There are several issues associated with potential misuse of power that will
require careful consideration by policymakers to keep both consumer markets
and distribution systems competitive and open. Lessons learned from devel-
oped markets should be used in formulating domestic policy in India.
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